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Abstract 
Although network governance and multi-level governance approaches have had to 
revise some of their claims, comparative empirical research and revised 
conceptualisations of the impact of European regional policies are rare. This paper 
conceives of European regional policy as a process of policy diffusion in which the 
supply side of (European) policies and the demand side of the domestic arena can be 
linked in different ways. The paper will present, firstly, an analysis of the 
opportunity structures European regional policies provide for domestic actors; and, 
secondly, a typology of different domestic constellations which lead to a different 
use of European policies. The empirical cases of eastern Germany and southern 
Italy, two of the most important underdeveloped areas in western Europe, 
demonstrate that the use of European policies for the empowerment of the regions 
and for a transformation of policies and polity are two of the possible results of the 
impact of European regional policy, but they are bound to very specific domestic 
preconditions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
European regional policies have been among the first policy areas in which 
attention shifted from analysing the building of European institutions to analysing 
the impact of these institutions on policies and polity of the member states - long 
before the debate on “Europeanisation” emerged. Network governance and 
multi-level governance approaches have deducted their analysis of the impact of 
European regional policies from their claim of a specific emergent European polity. 
Although, on the one hand, both approaches had to revise their core claims and, on 
the other hand, a broad literature on case studies had emerged, comparative studies 
on the differential impacts of European regional policies can hardly be found.1  
This paper conceives European policies as an opportunity structure for domestic 
actors. European policies can be used for the empowerment of one domestic actor or 
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to promote a transformation of policies and polity. However, in this process, the 
supply side, i.e. European policies, and the demand side, i.e. the respective domestic 
arena, are much less directly linked.  Furthermore, the opportunity structures of 
European regional policies are less uni-directional than multi-level governance and 
network governance approaches have claimed. The paper aims to provide a more 
comprehensive framework for the comparison of reactions to European policies by 
the domestic arena. Empirically, it will consider the case studies of eastern 
Germany and southern Italy,2 two of the most important underdeveloped areas in 
Western Europe. Both member states are founding members of the European Union 
and are known for a positive attitude towards European integration. Eastern 
Germany and southern Italy reach only about 60% of the GDP per capita of the 
national average and less than 70% of the European average. Therefore they are 
targets of national regional policies as well as beneficiaries of objective one 
programmes of the structural funds targeted at the least developed regions in 
Western Europe. Both areas receive about 20 billion Euro support by the structural 
funds in the period 2000 to 2006.  
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it will summarise the criticism brought 
forward against multi-level governance and network governance approaches. 
Secondly, it will analyse the opportunity structures European policies provide for 
domestic actors in vertical and horizontal governance. Thirdly, it will identify the 
character of domestic institutions and the position of the gate-keeper as the 
determining factors for the use of European policies. Fourthly, it will demonstrate 
how different institutional settings and the struggle for the position of the 
gate-keeper shaped the impact of European policies on regional policies in southern 
Italy and eastern Germany.  
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND 
NETWORK-GOVERNANCE APPROACHES 
Both multi-level governance and network governance approaches have linked their 
analysis of the impact of European regional policy to their claims of the character of 
the emergent European polity. Multi-level governance approaches have claimed 
that the emergence of a “third level in Europe” (Jeffery 1997) would empower the 
regions in Western Europe in relation to national governments. According to its 
proponents, European regional policies establish direct links between the 
Commission and the regions. These links produce an “upward stream” in policy 
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formulation, in particular with the organisation of regions in the Committee of the 
regions, and a “downward stream” in policy implementation given the strong role 
for the regions in the implementation of the structural fund programmes. The 
coherency and validity of these arguments had been called into doubt by three 
arguments. First, the role of the nation state has been underestimated. After initial 
mobilisation at the European level, regions returned to promote their interests 
through their national governments. Furthermore, regions that benefit from 
structural fund programmes mostly lack the institutional capacity to make full use 
of them and the political clout to be empowered by them (Bailey and de Propis 
2002). Second, regional policy is a “mixed blessing” (Thielemann 2002). Structural 
funds came into existence as a compensation for the effects of increased market 
competition brought about by the market liberalisation in the process of European 
integration. This process of “negative integration” included not only abolishing 
barriers to EU-wide trade but also cutting back on state aid for lagging regions. 
Some authors have even claimed that state aid control had been for a long time the 
most important European regional policy (Yuill et al 1997). Third, multi-level 
governance approaches have (somehow paradoxically) dealt with the interaction of 
governments in vertical governance and neglected the attempt of the Commission to 
bring non-state actors in. This latter process takes place at the sub-national level and 
poses requirements also for sub-national authorities. 
The proponents of the network governance approach claim that European policies 
are aimed less at differential empowerment than at a different quality of relations 
between different tiers of state authorities and non-state actors. They have predicted 
a more comprehensive and strongly “ideational” impact of European policies. The 
argument, in brief, is that the Commission is aware of the democratic deficit at the 
European level and the necessity of a sympathetic treatment of target groups. 
Consequently it promotes the inclusion of social and economic actors into a new 
mode of governance to increase legitimacy and efficiency of European policies. In 
particular, structural fund programmes constitute a policy field, which becomes an 
area of “socialisation” into new principles and procedures. 
In the EC context, involvement may be considered to be the most effective 
way of bringing about change in governance. … Being involved in the 
formulation and implementation of European policies and in the 
concertation of transnational interests, [the actors] become socialised to 
new practices. Being involved implies being part of an institutionalised 
learning process. Experience will teach the deficiencies and/or 
attractiveness of a particular mode of governance (Kohler-Koch 
1999:28-29).  
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The concept of network governance refers to a “specific system of interest 
mediation” that is based on the pursuit of partial interests by its actors (which 
distinguishes it from statism and corporatism which are based on the notion of a 
common interest) and the principle of concertation (which distinguishes it from 
pluralism that is based on majority decision) (Kohler-Koch 1999:20-23). 
However, evaluating the results of several German research projects, Kohler-Koch 
(2002) came subsequently to sober conclusions. Firstly, approval of the policy 
principles that are the base of European policy programmes, such as inclusion of 
social and economic actors and territorial competitiveness policy, does not 
necessarily coincide with the actual observable behaviour. On the contrary, policy 
adaptation and compliance with structural fund regulations takes the form of 
“symbolic change” and “isolated implementation” in “Europeanised” policies 
(Lang 2003). Secondly, even in the case of policy change it cannot even be taken for 
granted that policy principles are transferred from the European level. Policy 
change might as well be the result of a transnational process of policy diffusion or 
developments at a domestic level (Kohler-Koch 2002). Finally, the network 
governance approach has been criticised for not being suited to grasp the relations 
between different levels of policy areas (Benz and Eberlein 1999). The definition of 
“concertation of interests” relates to the interaction of state and non-state actors in 
horizontal governance, in which state actors have a mediating rather than steering 
role. However, this definition can hardly describe forms of vertical governance.   
To sum up, the impact of European policy is less clear-cut and one-directional and 
much more mediated by the domestic arena than established analytical approaches 
have suggested. From a different starting point, the debate on the “Europeanisation” 
of domestic policies came to similar conclusions. The debate started with 
emphasising the differential impact on member states but led to a widely shared 
sceptical view on conceiving the European impact as a causal mechanism for 
domestic change. On the one hand, adaptation pressure as a result of institutional or 
policy “misfit,” although mediated by filters such as the flexibility of domestic 
institutions (Boerzel and Risse 2001), is only in very exceptional cases the driving 
force of domestic change. On the other hand, domestic actors can exploit European 
policies for their own reform-oriented purposes, even if EU and domestic 
arrangements are compatible.  
The discussion of the process of policy diffusion will therefore proceed with a 
detailed analysis of the supply side of (European) policies, that is the opportunity 
structures European regional policy offer, before it will turn to the demand side, the 
constellations of the domestic arena which determine the way domestic actors use 
European policies.  
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OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY  
An analysis of European regional policy highlights the importance of distinguishing 
between vertical governance, that is the relation between the Commission, national 
and subnational authorities, and horizontal governance, that is the relation between 
state authorities and private and public interest groups at the regional and 
subregional level. Whilst in vertical governance the institutional relations the 
Commission promotes are closely related to economic development policies, in 
horizontal governance the institutional relations and administrative practices, which 
are promoted by the Commission, are interrelated. 
VERTICAL GOVERNANCE 
Network governance approaches have analysed how economic policies and a 
concept of participatory institutional relations converged in the conception of 
structural funds. The Commission attempted to spearhead a process of policy 
change in economic development policies that had already started in several 
member states (Ansell 2000). Economic development policies in Western Europe 
demonstrated a paradigm shift from an inward investment orientation towards an 
endogenous (or indigenous) development approach. The goal of the inward 
investment approach is to reduce regional disparities by attracting capital from 
outside the region in order to increase economic growth and employment. In 
contrast, the endogenous development approach aims to strengthen the endogenous 
economic potential and build the institutional capacity to make full use of it. The 
Commission portrayed its economic development policies as reflecting the general 
tendency that   
…policy makers are moving away from their former reliance on subsidies 
for investment and employment and measures are being oriented more 
towards improving competitiveness and the regional business 
environment through business-related infrastructure development 
(notably in the Netherlands), technology transfer and consultancy 
services, especially for marketing and exports. The nature of business 
related infrastructure provision is also changing: the traditional provision 
of industrial estates, factories and local services is being supplemented by 
the creation of enterprise and incubator units, technology and science 
parks and telematic centres (CEC 1994: 136-7). 
Referring to the need for knowledge and involvement in local and regional 
economic development, the Commission emphasised the necessity to involve 
regional and local authorities to increase the efficiency as well as the legitimacy of 
policy-making. The “partnership principle,” as the Commission called it (as aptly as 
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vaguely), was given an institutional frame with the participation of regional 
authorities in the elaboration of Community Support Frameworks (outlining the 
policies for the entire territory of southern Italy and western Germany respectively) 
and in the associated national monitoring committee. The Commission encouraged, 
furthermore, the elaboration of regional operational programmes (along national 
operational programmes for policy areas such as transport) and the delegation of 
responsibility to the relevant regional authorities, which are in many European 
member states regional governments.  
However, the “mode of governance” the Commission promotes can best be 
characterised as “contractualisation.” Negotiations with the Commission itself take 
place within a strong “shadow of hierarchy.” Policy formulation does not occur in 
egalitarian co-operation between the higher and the lower echelons of governance 
(as in German co-operative federalism). Firstly, the Commission sets the framework 
conditions for policy formulation by drafting the Community Support Framework 
(CSF), although on the basis of regional development plans submitted by the 
member state (in cooperation with regional authorities). Secondly, within the 
framework of the CSF the national or regional authorities elaborate national and 
regional operational programmes, but the Commission exerts a significant influence 
by the threat to withhold its approval. The control function of the Commission is 
most obvious with regard to the use of the classic instruments of the inward 
investment approach, investment and wage subsidies. Investment subsidies still 
remain part of the structural funds but they are subject to the limitations set by the 
Commission. Moreover, the Commission announced a stop to any permanent wage 
subsidies. In a similar vein, national governments can use the negotiations for the 
state aid control agreements as well as for Community Support Frameworks to set 
framework conditions for the regional operational programmes. Opportunity 
structures, therefore, encompass the empowerment of regional authorities as well as 
the “hollowing out but hardening” (della Sala 1997) of the central state by using the 
external bounds to stop permanent, unconditional support for lagging regions. The 
delegation of responsibility to the regional authorities as promoted by the 
Commission is based on an endogenous development approach, but goes along with 
an emphasis on “territorial competitiveness policies”. 
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE 
In horizontal governance, the institutional relations and administrative practices are 
interlinked in the conceptions of the Commission. The emphasis put on the 
integration of the different European structural funds for social policy, agricultural 
policy and regional policy, its link to developmental strategies, and a continuous 
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evaluation open up space for the inclusion of non-state actors in a process of 
deliberation.3 The Commission claims that   
…programming and evaluation […]together have created a policy 
making process with continuous improvement in the measures 
implemented (again the ‘learning organisation’) and which are often 
described as the main innovation to arise from the Funds (CEC 1999:11). 
In terms of administrative practices, “programming” means the integration of policy 
programmes of different ministries and their link to explicit developmental 
strategies. This approach aims at overcoming the divisions between departmental 
responsibilities, and between political decision-making and administrative policy 
programmes. In addition, the use of a comprehensive system of evaluations aims to 
introduce result-oriented administrative practices.  
Both approaches open up the possibility to include non-state actors in the 
deliberation of policy programmes and its surveillance and examination. Since the 
Commission retreated to some extent from participating in decision-making in the 
Monitoring Committees, it provided further technical assistance for private and 
public-interest groups in order to obtain the necessary expertise to evaluate the 
administrative documents. Opportunity structures in this process encompass the 
empowerment of private actors as well as the strengthening of the regional 
executive (and to some extent) the national executive by a tighter control of the 
success of policy measures. 
PRECONDITIONS FOR DOMESTIC RESPONSIVENESS: STRENGTH 
OF INSTITUTIONS AND POSITION OF THE GATE-KEEPER 
In the analysis of the use of European policies in eastern Germany and southern 
Italy, the paper will use a framework that avoids a methodological premise of 
whether the impact of European policies will be empowerment or policy 
transformation. It will use the “actor-centred institutionalist approach” developed 
by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995). This approach uses a narrow definition of 
institutions as formal rules. This definition avoids regarding institutions as 
determining behaviour. Mayntz and Scharpf emphasise that institutions guide the 
behaviour of actors but actors have at the same time the option to change the 
institutions (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:44). However, institutions are supported by 
informal rules or an institutional culture, which determines the propensity of actors 
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to seek for institutional change. Informal rules have been defined by Boerzel as 
“informal understandings about appropriate behaviour within a given formal rule 
structure” (Boerzel 1999:579). Boerzel analysed informal rules as determining 
actor’s behaviour in reaction to changes induced by Europeanisation. However, 
informal rules are not only relevant in cases of external shocks, but the relation 
between the informal rules and the formal rules is one of the moving forces for 
institutional change. This relation determines the propensity of domestic actors to 
use European policies to promote domestic change. It will therefore determine in 
policy areas such as regional policy whether change will occur at all, which leaves 
considerable leeway for domestic actors. The propensity of actors to change 
institutions will differ in various institutional settings according to how strongly 
formal rules are based on entrenched informal rules. This distinction allows us to 
incorporate the phenomenon that “imported” institutional settings determine formal 
rules, but day-to-day-interaction occurs according to well-entrenched informal 
rules. 
The paper will distinguish, according to the different relation between formal and 
informal rules, between uncontested institutions, parallel institutional settings, 
contested institutions and institutional voids. It will argue that domestic actors use 
European policies according to the “robustness” of domestic institutions. 
UNCONTESTED INSTITUTIONS  
In uncontested institutions, informal rules are congruent to formal institutions and 
accepted by all domestic actors. In uncontested institutions, the “logic of 
appropriateness” determines the behaviour of actors. If domestic institutions are 
characterised by strong informal rules, divergent formal rules of European 
structural fund regulations will be implemented in a formal and symbolic way but 
actors’ interaction will be guided by the well-entrenched informal rules. The impact 
of European policies will be limited, as dependent on the domestic institutional 
capacity, to adaptation or inertia. 
PARALLEL INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
Uncontested institutions can, however, encompass different institutional frames. In 
this case actors have to decide on the “coupling” of structural funds with domestic 
institutional frames. Actors can be empowered if they “couple” European policies 
with one of the different institutional frames in the domestic context. The impact of 
European policies, though, will be characterised by empowerment of one domestic 
actor whilst policy transfer will be limited. 
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CONTESTED INSTITUTIONS 
In contested institutions, not all domestic actors accept informal norms. Contested 
domestic institutions leave more leeway for interest-oriented strategies of actors. 
Actors, therefore, make selective use of European policies to push for change in 
domestic informal rules. The impact will be a mix of empowerment and policy 
transfer. 
INSTITUTIONAL VOID 
In a process of institutional change that leads to a temporary institutional void, 
European policies are used to foster the entrenchment of new informal rules. 
Comprehensive reforms of domestic policies will rather foster new relations 
between actors than the empowerment of one actor. The willingness to use 
European procedures to establish new institutional relations is the highest in this 
case.  
Whilst the strength of domestic institutions determines the propensity of domestic 
actors to use European policies to promote domestic reforms, the actor who 
occupies the broker position to the European Commission will determine the exact 
thrust of domestic reforms. This actor has been described as the gate-keeper but his 
function might as well be that of a gate-way for European policies. Therefore, two 
further preconditions and factors determine the impact of European policies: the 
institutional capacity of the gate-keeper and the policy convergence between the 
policy preferences of the gate-keeper and European regional polices. In addition, 
institutional capacity and policy convergence will be the decisive factors to obtain 
the position of gate-keeper to the Commission in the first place. Lastly, as the 
following case studies will show, European regional policies offer opportunity 
structures for different domestic reform projects and different combinations of 
policy transfer and empowerment of domestic actors.  
EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICIES IN EASTERN GERMANY 
VERTICAL GOVERNANCE: COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMES  
German regional policies reflect the characteristics of policy-making in Germany’s 
co-operative or interlocking federalism (Benz 1999, Sturm 2000). German regional 
policies are characterised by the co-existence of   (i) co-operative policy making in 
the “joint task development of regional economic structures” and (ii) exclusively 
regional competences in the other areas of regional policies.  Regional policies are 
therefore related to two sets of institutions that, moreover, incorporate different 
economic development strategies. 
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Although the constitutional assignment of responsibilities in Germany distinguishes 
between national, concurring and regional responsibilities, interlocking 
competencies are the prevalent form of co-operation between the territorial levels. 
German interlocking federalism is based on the assignment of most of the 
administrative tasks to the regional level on the one hand, and the far-reaching 
co-operation of the chamber of the regions in policy-making on the other hand. 
Regional policy, though, goes one step further as it is based on the interaction of the 
national and regional executives in the “joint task development of regional 
economic structures”. 
Regional policies were first introduced at the national level during the grand 
coalition of the Christian democrats and Social democrats (1966 to 1969) which 
together held a two thirds majority to make constitutional amendments. Several 
path-breaking reforms in this period were inspired by Keynesian demand policies 
and aimed at co-ordinating the expenditures of national and regional policies. In 
addition, the competency of the federal government for regional policies (as well as 
for the reform of the university system) was at least debatable. Therefore, 
programmes were conceptualised as “joint tasks” between the regions and the 
federal government in which both contribute 50% of the relevant resources. In 
addition, policy programmes were formulated together but implemented by the 
regions at their discretion. In terms of economic development policies, policy 
programmes followed the inward investment approach and were strictly limited to 
investment subsidies and business-related infrastructure. In the German context it 
was the “export-base” theory, which stated that economic growth is dependent on 
an increase in exports and, therefore, subsidies were limited to companies in the 
relevant economic branches. This institutional arrangement was due to the 
interlocking competencies and was so resistant to substantial change that it was 
described in Scharpf’s seminal work as a “joint-decision-making trap” (Scharpf 
1985). Scharpf pointed out that informal rules went even further than formal rules 
for majority decisions, and demanded unanimity in the negotiations between the 
federal and the Länder governments. As a result, he concluded that responsibilities 
became blurred and, due to the required unanimity among the regional 
governments, changes to the redistributive rules were only possible by increasing 
the resource transfers from the federal level. 
However, during the 1980s Länder governments developed their own regional 
policies that implemented the new instruments of the endogenous development 
approach. At the Länder level the theory of "endogenous development" took hold 
encompassing support for research and technology initiatives, qualification of 
workers, regional infrastructure, environment and housing supply, creating an 
innovative and stimulating climate for economic activity (Benz 1999:18). 
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Regional policies were a part of the policies of the Länder and aimed to raise their 
profile. They have been made possible by the allocation of resources from taxes, 
which are levied by the federal level, to the Länder according to rules established in 
the same period 1966 to 1969. The allocation of resources to the Länder within a 
comprehensive fiscal equalisation mechanism entailed a strongly egalitarian aspect. 
After unification the economically lagging Eastern German Länder were 
incorporated in the equalisation system. As a compensation for their much lower tax 
income, they were granted within the framework of “national solidarity pacts” 
transfers from the western Länder as well as significant additional resources from 
the federal government. On their part, the Länder have been eager to defend their 
own competencies by raising the hurdles for intervention by the federal government 
in the revision of the constitutional law in 1994. 
In the aftermath of German unification, the regional policy of the “joint tasks 
development of regional economic structures” became the core instrument of the 
economic development policies for eastern Germany. The joint tasks were 
substantially increased and became heavily bent towards the east4 (Anderson 1999). 
Investment subsides were regarded as the main instrument to compensate the loss of 
industrial substance as a result of the economic unification of eastern Germany, 
even more so when it became obvious that unification and the subsequent 
exposition of eastern German companies to the more advanced western competition 
led to a dramatic scaling down of eastern German companies and the loss of 
millions of jobs.  
The German government briefly considered renouncing structural fund support in 
exchange for more leeway for national regional policies. Subsequently, the 
Commission and the German government agreed on a simplified programme 
structure to include eastern Germany in the structural funds for 1991 to 1994. In this 
transition period, the federal ministry of economics occupied the position of 
gate-keeper in the relation to the Commission. It channelled the structural funds 
completely into the joint tasks. The ministry pointed to the economic rationale as 
well the lack of administrative capacity of the new regional governments. Despite 
initial dissenting voices in the eastern regions, the Commission agreed with the 
position of the federal government.  
The negotiations for the period of 1994 to 1999, however, brought about hard 
struggles between the Commission, some eastern Länder governments and the 
federal ministry of economics. The Commission regarded the inward investment 
                                              
4 Between 1991 and 2003 the new Länder received 47.215 million Euros and the old Länder received 5.181 million 
Euros out of the joint tasks development of regional economic structures 
(http://www.bafa.de/1/de/aufgaben/wirtschaft/gemeinschaftsaufgabe.htm [accessed 21.03.2005]). 
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policy of the joint tasks as outdated. It refused to finance any more greenfield estates 
in business-related infrastructure and insisted on a stronger emphasis on SMEs.  In 
addition, Saxony in particular and its minister-president Kurt Biedenkopf, a 
long-time adversary of chancellor Helmut Kohl in German politics, addressed the 
Commission directly and pushed for the opportunity to use structural funds outside 
the joint tasks. The eastern German Länder wanted to use European funds for their 
own regional policies targeting “indigenous” small and medium enterprises, as well 
as for environmental policies and basic infrastructure such as trunk roads. As a 
result, the joint tasks were to some extent modified to encompass some of the 
endogenous development policies, in particular to include investment subsidies for 
SMEs. In addition, a flexibility clause allowed the eastern German Länder to use the 
funds for other purposes, which complied with the very wide definition of 
development policies by the Commission. One salient example of environmental 
policies is the restoration of areas that have been damaged by the Russian military, 
in particular in the region of Brandenburg.  
Subsequently, the role of the federal government in the negotiations for the period 
2000 to 2006 was very limited. The German proposal for the Community Support 
Framework was a compilation of the regional development plans, which the 
ministry of economics had even outsourced to a consultancy agency. All eastern 
German regions used European funds outside of the joint tasks to a much higher 
degree as in the preceding period 1994 to 1999. Subsequently, the German 
government openly favoured, in the negotiations of the future of structural funds, a 
re-nationalisation of regional policies. In contrast, the eastern German Länder 
rejected its offers to be compensated by national regional policies. They wanted to 
maintain their discretion of policy formulation as well as the security of the 
European 7 year programmes which are not subject to domestic insecurity. 
Vertical governance in Germany demonstrated the logic that multi-level 
governance approaches are evoking: i.e. the pressure from below (the regional 
level) and from above (the European level) led to an empowerment of the regions. 
The regions could replace the federal ministry of economics as the gate-keeper to 
the Commission as they were to decide on the use of European funds in one of the 
competing institutional frameworks. In contrast, the federal ministries developed an 
animosity against European regional policies. A top civil-servant of the federal 
ministry of economics portrayed the relation between the two sets of regional 
policies as a zero-sum game and the Commission’s strategy as “double attack”: 
 (S)ince the mid 1970s the Commission pursues the strategic aim to push 
member states to the sideline in the area of regional policies. It does so by 
following a double strategy. By tightening up state-aid control it 
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constrains the options for German regional policy step by step. At the 
same time it extends its own competencies in the area of EU structural 
policy. By doing so it fills the policy gap it has created by its state aid 
control policy in the first place (Tetsch 1999:373). 
However, eastern German regions were not willing to accept European state aid 
control, as investment subsidies still play a prominent role next to policies for 
“endogenous development”. The often cited controversy about investment 
subsidies for the VW plants in the region of Saxony demonstrated a serious clash 
between the Commission on the one hand and the German federal and regional 
government on the other hand. Eastern German Länder had been empowered in 
their relation to the federal government but the policy change was limited.5 
Informal rules did not allow the national government to adopt a proactive stance in 
negotiations with the Commission in the context of the contractualisation-approach 
and to “invade” the areas of Länder regional policies.6 Moreover, no informal rule 
existed that would have demanded a similar compensation of the national 
government for the empowerment of the regional governments as was the case in 
the opposite effect of European integration (Boerzel 2000).  
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE: UNCONTESTED INSTITUTIONS 
The co-operation of the Länder governments with the Commission, in opposition to 
the national level in the negotiation of the CSF, did not lead them to regard the 
policies of the Commission on the regional level with similar approval. On the 
contrary, at the regional level European policies met uncontested and 
well-entrenched institutions. As a heritage of the late state-building process in 
Germany, most administrative functions are historically delegated to regional and 
local authorities. In addition, the German administrative tradition is based on a strict 
division between public and private actors.  Civil servants demonstrate a 
co-operative attitude towards private actors, however, they are held responsible to 
the state and not the public. Therefore civil servants have a formalistic and legalistic 
approach to policy implementation, which is clearly separated from the political 
decision-making process. In addition, policy-making is strongly sectoralised by the 
responsibilities of different ministries which interact mainly in “negative 
co-ordination”, that is, in case of tension between policies (Knill 2002:68-70). This 
                                              
5 Conzelmann (2002) himself revised an earlier opposite assessment of the controversy as a process of “policy 
learning” (in Conzelmann 1998). 
6 Only very recently the federal government attempted to achieve a say in the spending of resources within the 
framework of the domestic solidarity pact until 2019, which was negotiated in 2003 and encompassed resource 
transfers of 160 billion Euros. The Länder rejected the demands of the federal government point-blank. 
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character of German administration has rather been enforced in eastern Germany by 
the state-socialist legacy. 
In addition, even western Länder governments themselves have been analysed as 
lacking institutionalised co-operation with non-state actors. The German 
policy-making style has often been described as corporatist (Schmidt 1997). 
However, corporatist arrangements exist at the federal level, in particular in social 
policies, but are hard to find at a regional level. If there is a consultation of trade 
unions and employer organisations in the process of policy-making, it is rather 
based on personal contacts. Organised social and economic interest actors are at the 
margins of communication “networks” (Knodt 1998).  
Accordingly, the Commission’s suggestions and demands to include public and 
private actors into the monitoring committees and to provide them with technical 
assistance to obtain additional expertise were only reluctantly accepted and put into 
practice. Whereas regional and federal government could prevent the obligatory 
participation of non-state actors in the monitoring committees in the CSF for the 
period 1994 to 1999, it took several pointed letters from the commissioner for 
regional policies, Monika Wulf-Mathies, to the minister-presidents of regional 
governments to urge the Länder governments to include non-state actors in the 
monitoring committees at the Länder level. Despite a higher degree of compliance 
in the preparation of the operational programmes for 2000 to 2006, an examination 
of the “programming” process in Saxony, for instance, concludes that “the 
interaction has to be characterised as one-way-street” (Eckstein 2001:323). 
Social and economic partners on their part do only rarely participate actively in the 
deliberation of regional policies. As one representative in the region of 
Mecklenburg West Pomerania, which still stands out in the quality of the 
negotiations in the Monitoring Committees, put it: “Speaking alone to the ministries 
is more efficient.” Social and economic partners are in general more interested in 
information about access to funding in areas such as vocational (re-)training where 
both trade unions and employer organisations have interests at stake. Emblematic 
was the negative attitude of social and economic partners in several regions towards 
the Commission’s suggestion to get a vote in the Monitoring Committees as they 
rejected “to be held responsible” for the implementation of European funds.  
In addition, the administration regards the integration of programmes as well as 
their evaluation as neither necessary nor compatible with the German administrative 
system. German regions are given in the reports of the Commission as laggards in 
the elaboration of regional development strategies and plans. Evaluation is regarded 
with utmost suspicion by all levels of government in Germany. Even the failure of 
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numerous large investment projects did not change the conviction held by all levels 
of German administration that evaluations are not capable of measuring and 
comparing the effectiveness of policy implementation. In addition, the dependence 
of evaluators on the commissions from the administration is emphasised.7 As a 
result, structural funds are integrated in the ordinary administrative programmes 
with hardly any link between different programmes. 
To conclude, eastern German Länder had to comply with structural funds 
arrangements, but informal rules dominate the policy-making process. The 
integration of funds can only be found in the official reports and possibly as 
side-effects of the different departmental policies; evaluations are not accepted as 
an instrument to increase the quality of policy implementation. Monitoring 
committees rather serve as communication channels and testing ground for regional 
governments and administrations. Although regional administrations had to adapt to 
the formal rules of structural fund regulations and had the institutional capacity to 
do so, policy making follows informal rules based on the well entrenched 
policy-making style and administrative tradition. 
REGIONAL POLICIES IN SOUTHERN ITALY  
In contrast to the stable institutional environment of German regional policies, at the 
inception of European regional policies, institutional relations as well as economic 
development policies were increasingly contested in southern Italy. Regions were 
established in Italy in the first half of the 1970s, albeit with very limited 
competencies, and Italy had become a “decentralised unitary state.” However, the 
territorial structure of state organisation in Italy had been subject to controversy and 
political struggle since the end of the Second World War. In fact, the constitution 
had already prescribed the establishment of regions, but the governing Christian 
democrats feared (at that time) the domination of central Italian regions by the 
communist opposition. Therefore, the implementation of regional structures was 
limited to the granting of special statutes to Sicily, Sardegna, Trentino Alto-Adige 
and Venetia-Giulia. With the establishment of the regions, a slow process of 
decentralisation started. The transfer of resources was very limited and often 
connected to circumscribed purposes, in particular for (local) health services.  
In addition, these changes hardly effected the organisation of regional development 
policies in the south. The policies for the south were based since the 1950s on the 
“special intervention” by the Cassa per il mezzogiorno and a strong role of the 
state-owned holdings in economic development policies. In the post-war years the 
                                              
7 Officials of the ministry for economics caution against the emergence of an “evaluation mafia”. 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
86 
Cassa per il mezzogiorno was explicitly designed to circumvent the inefficient 
administration in the south. The Cassa as well as state holdings were founded as 
independent agencies and companies led by independent top personnel with a high 
degree of professionalism. This seemed to be a successful formula for economic 
development in the1950s and 1960s (Locke 1995). In fact, the gap between northern 
and southern Italy decreased and the living conditions in Italy improved 
considerably.  The economic strategy of the Cassa had followed an 
inward-investment strategy that neglected any embeddedness in local and regional 
economies.  State holdings were obliged to allocate up to 60% of their investment in 
the south (Locke 1995). As a result, numerous infamous examples of “cathedrals in 
the desert” emerged. In the 1980s the gap was visibly widening again and the 
negative effect on the endogenous potential of the south became obvious. Industrial 
districts, the landmark of the late development in central and northeast Italy, had 
virtually disappeared. In addition, the Cassa and the state holdings had become 
subject to political influence and interference and degenerated into resources for 
clientelist competition.  
Widespread dissatisfaction concerned the institutional model and the economic 
development strategies. Despite a growing transfer of resources (although from a 
very low level), subnational authorities did not have to bear any responsibility to 
account for its use. Some attempts, in particular in 1976 and 1986, were made to 
give regional governments more of a say in regional policies and to remedy the 
strong investment orientation of the policies for the south by introducing measures 
for small and medium enterprises. 
In the first period of structural funds from 1988 to 1993, the Commission tried to 
establish links to the regional governments and deal with them as policy brokers. 
Half of the resources of the structural funds were assigned to the regional 
governments and provided them with the first significant role in economic 
development policies. On its part, the central government for the first time feared 
being bypassed. The minister responsible for co-ordination of Community policies 
criticised that   
…the Commission […] insists on an unacceptable tendency to take 
initiatives directly involving regions, a procedure, which while it might 
appear faster, unbalances the contractual relationships and so in practice 
gives the Commission more freedom of manoeuvre and choice (cited in 
Desideri 1995:79). 
However, regional governments (with the exception of Basilicata) had neither the 
institutional capacity nor the same policy preferences as the Commission. Regional 
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governments were still focused on providing visible benefits to the largest number 
of voters by using traditional policy instruments, in particular the building of basic 
infrastructure. Structural fund implementation added another chapter in 
administrative failure and in Italy’s notoriously bad implementation record of 
European policies. The second period from 1994 to 1999 had to spend the 
considerable leftovers of resources from the first period, 1988 to 1993, which 
regional governments had simply not been able to spend according to the more 
demanding European regulations. Some reorganisation of the bureaucratic 
coordination of structural fund implementation took place. In particular, the 
establishment of the cabina di regia improved the bad implementation record but at 
the expense of relying again on traditional programmes such as infrastructure and 
investment subsidies (LaSpina 2003). In addition, regional governments tended to 
spend money on national programmes or the resources were reallocated to national 
programmes to prevent them from being forfeited. Empowerment and policy 
transfer to regional government was limited by their lack of institutional capacity 
and the lack of policy convergence.  
The economic and political crisis in Italian policies culminated in 1992 when Italy 
was forced to leave the European Monetary system due to its exorbitant inflation 
and budget deficit. At the same time, the tangentopoli scandal in Milano and the 
assassination of high profile judges in southern Italy by the mafia discredited the 
parties which had governed Italy since the end of the Second World War. This crisis 
led to the breakdown of the established party system and the disappearance of all 
five governing parties. In the course of the Italian transition, both the national 
ministry for state participation and the Cassa per il mezzogiorno, as symbols for 
clientelism and the waste of public resources, were abolished under the pressure of 
public referenda which threatened to do exactly that. As a result, this form of 
“parallel administration” (Baldi 2000) was abolished. In the aftermath of the 1992 
crisis, European polices were used by transitory governments to dismantle the 
remnants of the old policy for the south. The pressure of the Commission to limit the 
debts of the largest state holding IRI fostered the privatisation of the state-holdings. 
This influenced the Ciampi government to complete the removal of juridical 
obstacles to privatisation (OECD 1995:68). Another salient case of the use of the 
European leverage was the swift ending of wage subsidies (by the tax deductibility 
of social contributions) in the south, which had lowered the wage costs by up to 
20%. Although the Commission put pressure on Italy in this question, Pagliarini, the 
minister of the Northern League in the first Berlusconi government, used the 
negotiation in 1994 to end this support for the south much swifter than the 
Commission would have insisted on (and the phasing out was subsequently 
renegotiated by the following government) (Viesti 2003; Barca 2001). During this 
period European state aid control, the “stick” in European regional polices, 
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empowered the national government to limit and terminate “unconditional support” 
for the south by wage subsidies and public enterprises.  
Only with the election of a centre-left government after several transitory 
governments, mainly of technocrats, a reorganisation of regional policies in Italy 
took place. In this situation with the Department for development and cohesion 
policies (DPS, Dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo e coesione), a new actor 
emerged as policy broker and gate-keeper to the Commission. The DPS was 
designed as an administrative unit with a high degree of independence. It was 
assigned the function to lead the process of negotiation between the central state and 
the regions over planning agreements, and to negotiate them with the Commission. 
The DPS subsequently played a pivotal role in the reform of Italian regional policies 
at a time when the dismantling of the old policies for the south had left a 
considerable institutional void. Public investment had plummeted and the ordinary 
administration had to take over the responsibilities of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. 
The DPS used structural funds to promote a new mode of governance that combined 
the delegation of responsibility with increased control of the principles of policy 
formulation and a tight control of policy implementation by the central state. 
Institutional arrangements elaborated by the DPS have been characterised as 
“neo-centralisation” (Gualini 2001) or as a U-turn from “excessive 
decentralisation” (Piattoni 2003). The DPS had a similar conception of a 
contractualisation of the relations between the central and the regional governments 
as the Commission. The regions did not universally welcome the increased control 
this approach brought about; in particular Sicily and Sardinia with its special status 
resented the interference of the national government.  
In the relation between the central government and the regional governments, the 
latter were allocated more than 70% of the resources in the period 2000 to 2006.8 
However, the Community Support Framework provided a much stricter framework 
than in the previous periods. The developmental strategy of the DPS was explicitly 
based on the growth theories by Krugmann (1991), which focus on the external 
effects of agglomerations as the main factor for regional competitiveness. The CSF, 
therefore, limited investment subsidies and infrastructure works on the one hand, 
and assigned considerable resources to subregional programmes and territorial 
pacts on the other hand. Symptomatic was the disappearing of the axis “industry, 
craftship and services for enterprises” which was absorbed in the axis “local 
system.” The head of the DPS, a well-known economist, pointed out: 
                                              
8 In fact, including the reward reserve, a premium for the best performing regional programmes, the regional quota 
is near 80%. 
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Despite strong pressure from the conservative Italian confederation of 
Industrialists, incentives for businesses have been drastically reduced. A 
larger share of resources is thus left to finance projects proposed by local 
infrastructures and training and research facilities. Territorial pacts 
inside clusters therefore have a relevant role to play (Barca 2000:106). 
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE 
At the regional level also, substantial institutional gaps if not institutional voids 
emerged. First, a considerable part of administrative functions had been for decades 
assigned to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Second, the relations between regions and 
local authorities were at best contradictory, if not tense. Traditionally, it had rather 
been local authorities that had taken over (however rudimentary in the south) 
functions in economic development policies. 
The DPS engaged in an institution-building process in administrative practices and 
a large-scale experiment in new forms of territorial governance. Following up 
administrative reforms of the so-called Bassanini laws of 1998 that delegated a 
large part of the administration to the subnational level, the DPS attempted to 
diffuse a result-oriented administrative culture. Regional administrations were 
provided with evaluation units (“nuclei di evaluazione”) to strengthen the regional 
executive and tighten control of policy implementation. However, this did not 
coincide directly with the inclusion of non-state actors in the policy-making 
process. Private and public interest groups are weakly organised at the regional 
level in Italy. Instead of bringing non-state actors in, the DPS used another 
instrument the Commission had devised in the 2000-2006 period: the reward 
reserve. The reward reserve is allocated conditionally on the fulfilling of 
implementation criteria; a part of it is allocated only to the most successful 
programmes. In contrast to other member states such as Germany who strongly 
resented the introduction of the reward reserve, Italy added another 6% reserve to 
benefit the building of institutional capacity.  
On a subregional level, territorial pacts and territorially integrated programmes 
constituted a new form and a new level of territorial governance. Territorial pacts 
were developed in the Italian context at the same time (starting in 1996) when the 
Commission promoted Territorial employment pacts. Both were designed to 
encourage economic entities encompassing one or several provinces to elaborate 
common agreements for development projects with all relevant public and 
non-public actors. These should include commitments by the administration, 
employer organisation and trade unions to increase efficiency and flexibility in their 
co-operation. Accordingly, the resources spent on territorial pacts have been 
described as the “public incentive for local communities, which want to change the 
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rules of the game and of territorial governance” (Cersosimo and Wolleb 2001: 
221-222; cf. Trigilia 2001). The EU-supported pacts turned out to become the 
example of “best practice” in the Italian debate. They provided more resources in 
particular to employ technical staff, and established at the same time stricter 
regulations for the commitments of all participating actors (Cersosimo and Wolleb 
2001). Territorially integrated programmes, which followed the same scheme, 
became an important part in the period 2000 to 2006, encompassing around 20% of 
the regional expenditures. 
The aim of this new form of governance is evidently to replace the informal rules of 
co-operation in the common practice of dividing the spoils, and to encourage 
deliberative processes aiming at producing public goods. Territorial pacts and 
territorially integrated programmes became a large-scale experiment in “new modes 
of horizontal governance.” This attempt still has to be evaluated in detail, and 
differences within the regions have to be analysed. The conception of evaluation 
units in all regional governments is an example that demonstrates that the new 
concepts and ideas in administrative practices had been developed in the domestic 
context (as early as in the failed reforms of 1981). However, European policies 
provided some innovative procedures and the external bounds to enforce new rules. 
European policies conferred the approach of the DPS, in the words of Fabrizio 
Barca, “credibility and legitimacy.”9  
With the period 2000 to 2006, the responsibility for territorial integrated 
programmes and territorial pacts was handed over to the regions. The relation 
between the regions and territorial pacts became a new level of vertical governance. 
The regions were assigned a similar function for these pacts as the central 
government to the regions, that is to set framework conditions and evaluate and 
monitor the results. The DPS attempted to diffuse this new mode of governance in 
the relation between the central government and the regional governments, and 
encouraged regional governments to establish the same relationship between 
regional governments and subregional territorial pacts and territorially projects and 
pacts. 
Whereas the DPS demonstrated a high degree of policy convergence and the 
institutional capacity to promote the reforms in vertical governance at a regional 
and subregional level, it is rather dependent on the institutional capacity and the 
policy convergence of regional and local actors whether these reforms will be a 
period of policy innovation or transformation. However, the institutional void and 
the emergence of a new policy broker led to the use of European policies to reform 
administrative practices and institutional relations. In the Italian case, it concerned 
                                              
9 Personal interview in September 2003. 
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the relations between regional and subregional entities as well as within these 
subregional entities. 
CONCLUSION 
The case studies have demonstrated considerable differences in the use of European 
policies. In Germany’s co-operative federalism, the Länder in eastern Germany 
have been empowered as they replaced the federal ministry of economics in the 
position of gate-keeper to the Commission. They are to decide as to which of the 
competing domestic institutional frames they use European funds, either within the 
co-operative policy-making in the joint tasks or within their own regional policies 
of the Länder. This process of empowerment came close to the mechanism 
multi-level governance approaches have evoked: the coalition of pressure from 
below and from above on national policies. In contrast, no informal rules existed in 
Germany that would have allowed the federal government to use the 
contractualisation in European programmes to “invade” the regional policies of the 
Länder. In fact, even the demands of the federal government to have its say in the 
spending of the resources, which the solidarity pact transferred to the eastern 
Länder, have been point-blank refused by the eastern Länder.  
In addition, European policies led only to limited policy change, as the eastern 
regions were not willing to accept European limitation on the inward-investment 
policies. Furthermore, as uncontested institutions existed at the regional level both 
with regard to the process of policymaking and in terms of administrative practices, 
informal rules dominated policy-making in the area of “Europeanised” policies. 
Vertical governance in Italy was, from the inception of European regional policies, 
based on contested institutions. Centralised policy-making in vertical governance 
and a strong investment-orientation in economic development policies were 
executed by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and the state-owned holdings. Regional 
governments were not able to use in this situation the position as gate-keeper due to 
a lack of institutional capacity and policy convergence. Subsequently, in the 
aftermath of the Italian political and economic crisis in 1992, the national 
government was empowered by the use of European policies to enforce the ending 
of inward investment policies. It was only in the resulting situation of an 
institutional void that the position as gate-keeper was assigned to the newly 
established DPS in Italy. The DPS used European policies to push for the diffusion 
of a new mode of governance and strongly endogenous-development oriented 
economic policies. A new mode of governance is rather characterised by 
contractualisation in vertical governance and deliberation in horizontal governance 
on a subregional level. In addition, the conceptions have been developed in the 
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domestic context but European policies provided the detailed procedures and the 
“external bounds” to put them into practice. 
Do European policies foster or even lead to a convergence of development paths in 
regional policies? There is a common tendency in Western Europe towards the 
adoption of the endogenous development approach and the establishment of some 
form of regional authorities. However, these developments are clearly the result of 
domestic economic and political changes and differences remain considerable. 
Despite increasing criticism, Germany and in particular eastern Germany still hold a 
strong inward-investment orientation in addition to endogenous development 
policies. Somehow ironically, the strong position of the regions in the German 
co-operative policy-making, which exceeds the degree of decision-making power in 
the Commission’s contractualisation approach, has further been strengthened. 
However, given the increasingly contested poor results in eastern Germany, 
co-operative federalism might turn from strength to weakness in the German 
domestic context. 
As far as horizontal governance is concerned, a tendency toward result-oriented 
administrative practices can often be found, but is far from universal. As 
demonstrated, German administrative tradition shows considerable resistance. Even 
more so, policy-making in networks remains a vision. Moreover, it is debatable 
whether the regional level is the appropriate territorial dimension to develop a dense 
net of actors for the direct co-operation in economic development projects, when 
“economic regions” are usually much smaller (McAllevy and de Rynck 1997). 
Subregional territorial pacts in Italy are an interesting policy experiment in this 
respect; it still has to be fully evaluated. 
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